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I. NEGLIGENCE
A. DUTY
N Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears' a worker was injured when struck by a
front-end loader while operating another loader. The loaders came
equipped with removable cages that would have prevented the
worker's injury, but his employer had removed the cages. The loaders'
manufacturer failed to warn of the dangers of operating a loader without
the cages. The Texas Supreme Court held that this particular danger was
so indisputably obvious that the manufacturer did not have a duty to
warn.2 Thus, the duty to warn applies to hazards of which the consumer
is unaware, and not to risks that are within the community's common
knowledge or that are obvious to anyone who observes the product.3
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe4 the laboratory performed a
urinalysis drug test as ordered by Doe's prospective employer. The labo-
ratory did not inform Doe that poppy seeds were known to cause positive
test results. Doe failed the test, due to her ingestion of poppy seeds, and,
as a result, was not hired by A potential employer. The court declined to
impose a duty on drug-testing laboratories to warn test subjects about
possible influences on test results.5 Since the lab did not control the use
of the test results, the court did not suggest that any duty be placed on the
laboratory under these limited facts.6
In Durham Transportation, Inc. v. Valero7 a child was struck by a car
while crossing a two-lane highway to reach a parked school bus. The
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he exercise of ordinary
care towards a child may require different conduct than would be re-
quired towards an adult."8 The court held that a bus driver's "duty to use
reasonable care extends to children awaiting or approaching the bus," not
just to children on the bus.9 Also, the court found that there was legally
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of proximate cause; that
the child would cross the street in order to board the bus was a foresee-
1. 911 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. 1995).
2. Id. at 382.
3. Id.
4. 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995).
5. Id. at 354.
6. Id
7. 897 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied).




able result of the school bus being parked across the street.10
In Pettitte v. SCI Corp." the Houston Court of Appeals held that a
building owner did not owe a duty to a previous tenant suffering from
"sick building syndrome" whose injuries occurred before the owner
bought the building and who had left the building before the owner
bought it.12 However, the court held that the owner might still owe a
duty to those occupants whose injuries occurred before the owner bought
the building but who continued to work in the building after he bought
it.13
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held in Ryan v. Friesenhahn14 that
a social host owes a duty to a minor guest to whom alcohol is served at a
party. The court stated that this duty exists because serving minors any
amount of alcohol is a criminal offense, and because the adult host may
control the minor.' 5
B. CAUSATION
In Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton16 the Texas Supreme Court declined
to find causation under attenuated facts. In Allbritton, a pump manufac-
tured by the defendant caught fire and ignited the surrounding area. An
employee assisted in abating the fire. After the fire was extinguished, the
employee walked across an above-ground pipe rack, rather than taking
the safer route around it. The employee slipped off the pipe rack, which
was wet because of the fire, and was injured. Although the fire caused by
the defective pump might be considered the "but for" cause of the em-
ployee's injuries, the court held that the "circumstances surrounding [the]
injuries [were] too remotely connected with Union Pump's conduct or
pump to constitute a legal cause of [the] injuries.' 7 The court stated that
all forces generated by the fire had come to rest by the time the employee
fell off the pipe rack.' 8 The Austin Court of Appeals also addressed the
issue of causation in Kerrville State Hospital v. Clark.'9 A hospital re-
leased a patient, who was not complying with his oral medication regi-
men, without using an injectable anti-psychotic drug to ensure
medication compliance. The patient then brutally murdered his es-
tranged wife. The court held that the hospital's failure to use the drug
was a cause-in-fact of the woman's death.20 Expert testimony concerning
past violence and the dangers of not medicating, along with the fact that
the patient murdered his wife just seven days after his release, provided
10. Id at 411.
11. 893 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.).
12. Id at 749.
13. Id.
14. 911 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ requested).
15. Id. at 117.
16. 898 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1995).
17. Id. at 776.
18. Id.
19. 900 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ granted).
20. Id. at 438.
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evidence from which the jury could conclude that the hospital's failure to
medicate caused the wife's death.21 The murder was foreseeable because
the hospital could have reasonably anticipated that the patient might
commit an act of violence against his wife if he was not medication
compliant. 22
In Click v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.23 the Houston Court of
Appeals applied the Lohrmann24 test to determine causation from cir-
cumstantial evidence in an asbestos case. The Lohrmann test requires
"evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some
extended period of time in proximity to where plaintiff actually worked"
to support causation. 25 In Click, an employee worked for a company
which used asbestos-containing products during his employment, includ-
ing the products made by the defendant. The products were seen near
the employee, but the evidence that the employee was actually exposed
to the products was circumstantial.26 However, the court held that this
evidence was sufficient to support an inference of causation.27
C. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The Texas Supreme Court addressed several cases concerning liability
for the criminal conduct of third parties. In Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater
Dallas, Inc.28 the court held that the club's failure to investigate a volun-
teer did not proximately cause the sexual molestation of several boys by
that volunteer.29 "Assuming the Boys Club had investigated [the volun-
teer's] criminal record, revelation of the two misdemeanor DWI convic-
tions would not have precluded [his] presence at the club."' 30 Also, the
court held that the connection between the assaults on the boys and the
club's failure to find the DWIs was so remote that reasonable minds
would not have anticipated the danger.31
In Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler32 a condominium resident was attacked
and kidnapped from the condominium's parking garage. The court found
that although the corporation had the power to elect board members, it
had no direct power to make security decisions, and therefore had no
control over security at the condominium. 33 Thus, the corporation's in-
fluence upon the board was too attenuated to impose a legal duty upon it
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 899 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
24. Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986).
25. Id. at 1162-63.
26. Click, 899 S.W.2d at 378.
27. Id.
28. 907 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1995).
29. Id. at 477.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 478.
32. 899 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. 1995).
33. Id at 198-99.
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to protect condominium residents from criminal acts of third parties.34
Similarly, the court held in Butcher v. Scott35 that the beneficial owner
of a house was not in control of the premises when a child was sexually
abused on the premises, and thus owed no duty to the child.36 The court
stated that neither the beneficial owner's presence on the premises, nor
the fact that his future interest in the premises was insured against loss
establish that he controlled the premises.37 Both the Centeq and Butcher
holdings rest on fact-specific issues concerning the amount of control that
the specific defendants possessed.
In Porter v. Nemir38 plaintiffs sued the employer for negligently hiring
and retaining a counselor who had a sexual encounter with the patient's
wife. The counselor had previously informed his supervisor that he had
begun a sexual relationship with another former client in violation of the
program's policy. The Austin Court of Appeals held that the drug and
alcohol counselor's employer had a duty to investigate the counselor's
conduct upon becoming aware of the first relationship. 39 This investiga-
tion would have revealed the counselor's lack of fitness.40 The employer
also had a heightened duty to hire and retain competent counselors, as
the program treated psychologically fragile clientele.41 The court stated
that the fact that the sexual encounter occurred off-premises and after-
hours does not absolve the employer of liability.42
D. PREMISES LIABILITY
In City of McAllen v. De la Garza43 the Texas Supreme Court held that
as a matter of law, a city (as owner of a "caliche" pit abutting the high-
way) did not have a duty to make the pit safe for those who deviated
from an adjoining roadway onto the city's property." The landowner
only has a duty to those who deviate from the highway in the ordinary
course of travel.45 In this case, the driver was intoxicated, was not travel-
ing with reasonable care and did not deviate from the road in the ordi-
nary course of travel.46
The Houston Court of Appeals addressed the Texas recreational use
statute in Lipton v. Wilhite.47 In that case, a social guest sued the land-
owner for injuries sustained while diving from the landowner's dock. The
34. Id. at 199.
35. 906 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1995).
36. Id. at 16.
37. Id. at 15-16.
38. 900 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
39. I& at 386.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 387.
42. Id.
43. 898 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1995).
44. Id. at 812.
45. Id.
46. I&. at 810.
47. 902 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
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guest asserted that the recreational use statute "does not shield a land-
owner from liability for injuries that a social guest sustains while engaged
in a recreational activity on the owner's property. '48 The court held that
"the statute was only intended to apply to persons who would otherwise
be trespassers but [were given] permission" to be on the property.49 The
statute encourages landowners "to allow persons whom he would not
otherwise invite as social guests to enter his land for recreational pur-
poses free of charge." 50 The Austin Court of Appeals held similarly in
McMillan v. Parker.51
In Moreno v. Brittany Square Assocs.5 2 the Houston Court of Appeals
held that the Property Code's notice requirements did not preempt a ten-
ant's personal injury claim.53 The tenant fell down stairs inside her apart-
ment, the fall allegedly resulting from her landlord's negligence in not
providing rails on the stairway and in failing to disclose the dangerous
condition. Since the plaintiff was unaware of the condition, she could not
have given notice.54 The court stated that if the notice requirements were
applied to this type of case, a plaintiff could rarely sue for personal injury
damages resulting from such a hidden defect because of the impossibility
of providing notice. 55
The Waco Court of Appeals in Stein v. Gill56 held that a landlord owed
no duty to a tenant who was injured when she slipped and fell on con-
crete steps.5 7 Since the steps were within the tenant's exclusive control,
the landlord would only be liable for any hidden defects which he failed
to disclose.58 The court stated, however, that a landlord owes a duty to
exercise reasonable care when he retains control over a part of the prem-
ises that the tenant is entitled to use. 59
In Endsley v. Johnson County Sheriff's Posse, Inc.60 the Waco Court of
Appeals held that a lessor is liable to a lessee when the land is leased for
public admission.6' A lessor leased a rodeo arena to a lessee for one day
in order to conduct a barrel race where the public would be invited.
While attending the race, a man was struck in the eye by a rock that was
most likely kicked in the air by a horse. The court stated that because the
"lessee [was] only in possession for a short period of time, it would be
futile to expect [him or] her to undertake any meaningful repairs to make
48. Id. at 599.
49. Id. at 600.
50. Id.
51. 910 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
52. 899 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
53. Id. at 263.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 895 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
57. Id. at 503.
58. Id. at 502.
59. Id.
60. 910 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, writ granted).
61. Id. at 8-9.
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the premises safe for the public."'62 The duty must be placed with the
lessor who has the actual ability to adequately inspect the premises on a
regular basis for dangerous conditions and correct them. 63
E. JoINT ENTERPRISE
In Blount v. Bordens, Inc.64 the Texas Supreme Court discussed the
third, of four, elements necessary to prove a joint enterprise: a commu-
nity of pecuniary interest.65 Two men, both passengers in the same truck,
were killed in a collision with a milk truck. At the time of the accident,
the men were returning from picking up racehorses, and one of the men
indicated to his father that he would be able to pay some bills when he
returned. The court held that under the facts of this case, the plaintiff did
not establish common pecuniary interest to support his claim of joint en-




In St. John v. Pope68 the Texas Supreme Court held that an on-call
physician, consulted by an emergency room physician over the phone, did
not owe a duty to an emergency room patient.69 Although the on-call
physician expressed his opinion that the patient should be transferred to
another facility, he never agreed to examine or treat the patient. Thus,
no patient-physician relationship was created. Although the physician
"listened to [the emergency room physician's] description of [the pa-
tient's] symptoms, and came to a conclusion about the basis of [the pa-
tient's] condition, he did so for the purpose of evaluating whether he
should take the case, not as a diagnosis for a course of treatment." 70
Park Place Hospital v. Milo7' involved a patient that had only a forty
percent chance of surviving her preexisting conditions, yet received sub-
standard care which allegedly resulted in her death. The court held that
since the plaintiff would not, in reasonable medical probability, have sur-
vived the underlying illness, the hospital was not liable.72
The Texas Supreme Court granted writ in Heise v. Presbyterian Hospi-
tal of Dallas73 to consider whether a medical degree automatically quali-
62. Id. at 9.
63. Id at 8.
64. 910 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1995).
65. Id at 933.
66. Id
67. Id.
68. 901 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1995).
69. Id. at 423.
70. Id. at 424.
71. 909 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. 1995).
72. Id at 511.
73. 888 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1994, writ granted).
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fled a witness to testify on any medical issue. In Heise, an emergency
room doctor was called to testify that, if doctors had performed a CT scan
during the first emergency visit, the plaintiff would have been properly
treated. The Eastland Court of Appeals held that even though the doctor
was not a neurosurgeon, "he possessed knowledge and skill not possessed
by people generally." 74 Therefore, his testimony should not have been
excluded by the trial court.75 The San Antonio Court of Appeals reached
a similar conclusion in Hernandez v. Altenberg76 where an anesthesiolo-
gist was held qualified to testify about the negligence in leaving a guide
wire in a patient's heart-even though he was not a hematologist.77
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Penick v. Christensen78 held that
the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act's procedure for
obtaining a patient's informed consent through disclosure of risks speci-
fied by the Texas Medical Disclosure Panel did not violate patients' con-
stitutional rights to privacy, open courts, freedom to contract, equal
protection, or due process.79
In Schexnider v. Scott & White Memorial Hospital80 the Austin Court of
Appeals held that affidavits which merely state that the affiant is familiar
with the standard of care and that the approximate standard was met
were insufficient to support summary judgment in a medical malpractice
case.81 The court held that the affiants "'must state what the standard is
and say what was done to meet it,"' not just that the standard was met. 82
B. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
In Peeler v. Hughes & Luce83 a client sued her attorney for malpractice
because he failed to tell her that she had been offered absolute transac-
tional immunity. She learned about this offer three days after pleading
guilty. The court held that plaintiffs who have been convicted of a crimi-
nal offense may recover on their legal malpractice claims only if their
conviction has been exonerated on direct appeal.84
In Haynes & Boone v. Bowser Bouldin, Ltd.85 the Texas Supreme
Court held that a law firm's handling of a client's litigation defense was
not a producing cause of the foreclosure of the client's shopping center.86
The client claimed that the loss of its lawsuit contributed to the loss of its
74. Id at 266.
75. Id at 267.
76. 904 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ).
77. Id. at 738.
78. 912 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], 1995, writ requested).
79. Id.
80. 906 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
81. Id at 661-62.
82. Id. at 661 (quoting Armbruster v. Memorial Southwest Hosp., 857 S.W.2d 938, 941
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
83. 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995).
84. Id at 497-98.
85. 896 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1995).
86. Id. at 183.
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tenant, which eventually caused the foreclosure. However, the court
stated that the loss of a tenant is not the same as the loss of a lawsuit.
Therefore, the law firm could not be held liable. 87
The court held in Sanchez v. Hastings88 that the limitations period gov-
erning a legal malpractice claim based on failure to sue all tortfeasors was
tolled until the litigation against others liable for the same injury had con-
cluded.89 The court reasoned that a client should not be forced to take
inconsistent positions in the underlying litigation and in the malpractice
action that might jeopardize his or her success in both.90
III. INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The Texas Supreme Court held in Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v. John-
son9' that questioning an employee about a possible theft did not consti-
tute the "extreme and outrageous conduct" necessary to sustain a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.92 The court stated that the
employer merely asked a management-level employee to explain a credi-
ble report of wrongdoing, which was within the employer's legal rights. 93
Although the duty not to negligently inflict emotional distress no
longer exists, the Houston Court of Appeals in Daigle v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co.94 ruled that a plaintiff may recover for the infliction of emo-
tional distress or mental anguish when a defendant breaches another
legal duty.95 Here, the plaintiff alleged he rescued people injured as a
result of defendant's negligence, and in so doing, he was exposed to great
risk of injury or death, which resulted in emotional distress that was rea-
sonably foreseeable. 96 The court held that the rescue doctrine applies




In Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail-
way98 the Texas Supreme Court held that under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, a Federal Safety Appliance Act claim is considered a strict
liability claim, rather than a claim of negligence per se.99
87. Id. at 182.
88. 898 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1995).
89. Id at 288.
90. Id.
91. 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995).
92. Id at 644.
93. Id
94. 893 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd by agr.).
95. Id. at 122.
96. Id.
97. Id at 123.
98. 890 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1994).
99. Id at 457.
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B. BREACH OF WARRANTY
In Walden v. Jeffrey °00 the Texas Supreme Court held that implied war-
ranties do not apply to "a product provided as an inseparable part of the
rendition of medical services."' 0 Thus, a dentist who supplied ill-fitting
dentures was not liable for a breach of implied warranty relating to the
product. Instead, the dentist was liable for negligence in rendition of
dental services, which included fitting the dentures. 102
C. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In Quest Chemical Corp. v. Elam10 3 the Texas Supreme Court held that
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") pre-
empted all common law tort suits based solely upon labeling claims
against manufacturers of EPA-registered pesticides. 104 On the other
hand, FIFRA does not always preempt state-law claims for strict liability
or breach of implied warranty.' 05 Under the facts of this case, FIFRA
preempted the plaintiff's strict liability and breach of implied warranty
claims "because they [were] based solely upon [the defendant's] alleged
failure to provide adequate warnings and instructions on its product.' 06
V. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
As stated above, the Texas Supreme Court case of Walden v. Jeffery 0 7
involved a patient who alleged that her dentist was liable for breach of
implied warranty for supplying her with ill-fitting dentures. The patient
also alleged a violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA").
However, the court stated that the patient's allegation did not indicate
anything other than negligence by the dentist. 08 The court found that
the patient "simply recast her negligence claim as a DTPA claim," which
is precluded by section 12.01(a) of the Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act.'0 9 The court held similarly in Gormley v. Stover," 0
where the issue was whether the dentist's selection and performance of a
surgical procedure met the standard of care for dentists in such circum-
stances. The court stated that the allegations were merely an attempt to
disguise a malpractice claim as a DTPA action."' While a plaintiff may
use the DTPA against a physician who engages in knowing misrepresen-
tations or breaches an express warranty, a doctor is not liable under the
100. 907 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1995).
101. Id. at 448.
102. Id.
103. 898 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1995).
104. Id. at 820.
105. Id.
106. Id at 820-21.
107. 907 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1995).
108. Id at 448.
109. Id.
110. 907 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1995).
111. Id at 450.
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DTPA for his acts in providing medical services. 112
The Texas Supreme Court held in Transport Insurance Co. v. Fair-
cloth113 that a minor did not have an actionable DTPA claim against the
tortfeasor's insurer for failure to disclose information in negotiating a set-
tlement of a wrongful death claim.114 The court reasoned that "an in-
surer negotiating with a third party [was] neither inducing a 'consumer'
into a transaction nor withholding information concerning 'goods and
services"' as those terms are defined by the DTPA." 5
In Trimble v. Itz" 6 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a
multi-million dollar insurance company could not assume the "consumer"
status of its subrogee for DTPA purposes.117 As a result, an insurer may
not bring a claim under the DTPA separate from its subrogee's claims." 8
The court stated that this is true, even when an insurer receives the in-
sured's rights in a subrogation action, because the statutory definition of
"consumer" contains no exception for subrogees."19
VI. DEFAMATION AND FALSE LIGHT INVASION
OF PRIVACY
In Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe120 the Texas Supreme Court held that a
newspaper was not liable for disclosing private facts about a victim of
sexual assault which made her identifiable by her acquaintances. 12' In
this case, a reporter obtained an unredacted copy of a police report
describing an assault and disclosing certain identifying information about
the victim, such as her age, occupation, make of her car, and her business
ownership. The reporter wrote articles which included this information,
and the newspaper published the articles. The court stated that "[tiacts
which do not directly identify an innocent individual but which make that
person identifiable to persons already aware of uniquely identifying per-
sonal information, may or may not be legitimate public interest."' 22 The
court felt that it was unreasonable to require the media to "sort through
an inventory of facts" and "catalogue ... them according to their...
impact.' 23 Further, such an approach may cause "critical information of
legitimate public interest to be withheld."'1 24 The Court stated that the
articles did not disclose "embarrassing private facts which were not of
112. Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. 1994).
113. 898 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. 1995).
114. Id. at 273-74.
115. Id. at 273.
116. 898 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied per curiam, 906 S.W.2d
481).
117. Id. at 372.
118. Id
119. Id.
120. 915 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1996).






legitimate public concern."'1 25 Therefore, the newspaper could not be
found liable under an invasion of privacy cause of action.126
VII. IMMUNITIES
The Texas Supreme Court held in City of LaPorte v. Barfleld127 that the
1981 version of the Political Subdivisions Law waives governmental im-
munity for retaliatory discharges, but only for the limited relief of rein-
statement and back pay. Similarly, the court in Kuhl v. City of Garland128
held, in a per curiam decision, that the 1989 Political Subdivisions Law
waives governmental immunity for retaliatory discharges, and in addition
to reinstatement and back pay, authorizes recovery of actual damages
subject to the restrictions of the Texas Tort Claims Act.129
In DeWitt v. Harris County1 30 the plaintiff sued an officer in a wrongful
death action, but the officer had official immunity. The Texas Supreme
Court held that a governmental entity did not have respondeat superior
liability under the Texas Tort Claims Act for the negligence of an em-
ployee possessing official immunity.' 31 The court in Kassen v. Hatley132
held that government-employed medical personnel are not immune from
tort liability if the character of the discretion they exercise is medical and
not governmental. 33 In Kassen, doctors claimed they did not admit a
patient into the hospital because her file indicated that hospitalization
was not therapeutic for her. Because this exercise of discretion was medi-
cal only, the doctors were not entitled to official immunity.134
VIII. DAMAGES
A. MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES
In State Farm Life Insurance Co. v. Beaston135 the Texas Supreme
Court held that a finding of knowing conduct is a prerequisite to the re-
covery of mental anguish damages as "actual damages" available under
article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. 136 A married couple bought their life
insurance policies from an agent. The couple failed to pay the premium
on the policy, so the 31-day grace period went into effect. Three days
after the grace period expired, the husband died. The insurance company
refused to pay the benefits under his life insurance policy, claiming that
coverage had expired before his death.
125. 915 S.W.2d at 721.
126. Id.
127. 898 S.W.2d 288, 297 (Tex. 1995).
128. 910 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1995).
129. Id. at 930.
130. 904 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1995).
131. Id. at 654.
132. 887 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1994).
133. Id. at 11.
134. Id. at 12.
135. 907 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. 1995).
136. Id. at 436.
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The wife sued for mental anguish damages under the Insurance Code.
The Insurance Code provides that parties may recover their actual dam-
ages against a defendant who has violated the Code's provisions.137 The
court. construed "actual damages" to mean those damages which are re-
coverable at common law, including mental anguish.138 The court held
that a culpable mental state is required in addition to the other prerequi-
sites for recovery of mental anguish damages under common law. 139
In Cathey v. Booth 40 the court held that a mother could recover
mental anguish damages resulting from negligent medical care, including
the loss of a fetus.' 4 ' Similarly, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in
Edinburg Hospital Authority v. Trevino'42 held that a mother had a cause
of action for medical negligence even though the stillborn fetus did not
have a claim.143 Also, her husband could recover as a bystander to the
negligent treatment of his wife because his emotional distress resulted
from tangible physical injury to her.1'"
In Star Houston, Inc. v. Shevack 45 the Houston Court of Appeals held
that the facts presented sufficient evidence to support an award for
mental anguish. 46 The defendant committed fraud on the plaintiff at a
time when the customer had a short life expectancy and financial difficul-
ties. The customer was diagnosed with a life-threatening pancreatic con-
dition, lost his business and his house, had banks suing him, and had huge
unpaid medical bills. The court noted that a tortfeasor whose actions
cause another to suffer mental anguish must take his plaintiff as he finds
him.147 The court also held that the demeanor of the plaintiff and other
witnesses, the emotion evident in their testimony, and the "gut feeling"
they projected to the jury may all be presented as proof of mental
anguish.' 48
In Wyatt v. Kroger Co.' 49 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that
the "relationship between a business owner and an invitee does not en-
compass liability for emotional distress absent evidence of physical
harm."' 50 A mother and daughter witnessed an act of indecent exposure
at a grocery store. Since they received no criminally inflicted physical
injury or property loss, they could not seek mental anguish damages
against the grocery store owner based upon the criminal conduct of a
137. Id. at 435.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 436.
140. 900 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1995).
141. Id. at 342.
142. 904 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, n.w.h.).
143. Id. at 835.
144. Id. at 837.
145. 886 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
146. Id. at 421.
147. Id. at 418.
148. Id. at 420.
149. 891 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).





The Texas Supreme Court in Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Davis 52
held that in order to recover punitive damages, a workers' compensation
claimant must obtain a jury finding entitling her to damages in addition to
the insurance policy proceeds being wrongfully withheld. 53 The jury
only awarded damages for the benefits not paid and not for any addi-
tional, independent injury flowing from the insurer's refusal to pay.' 54
The jury did not find any injury to the claimant independent of the claim
for the wrongfully denied workers' compensation benefits. Therefore, no
independent tort existed on which to base punitive damages.' 55
Similarly, the Court in Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois v. Fuller156
held that article 16, section 26 of the Texas Constitution does not create
an independent cause of action for punitive damages where no cause of
action for compensatory damages otherwise exists. 157 The plaintiff sued
the insurance company, claiming that their gross negligence proximately
caused her father's death. The Supreme Court held that the constitution
only guarantees the remedy of punitive damages when a wrongful death
beneficiary otherwise possesses a cause of action for compensatory relief,
which does not violate the Open Courts Provision.158
In Universal Services Co. v. Ung'59 the court discussed the test for gross
negligence when determining whether the defendant's conduct created an
extreme degree of risk. The court held that the evidence was legally in-
sufficient to support the jury's finding that an employee's death while
working with a cleaning crew alongside an interstate highway was a result
of gross negligence on the employer's part.' 60 The employee was killed
when a truck hit a pothole and its trailer came off. Under these limited
and specific facts of this case, the court held that the risk created was not
so extreme as to create a "likelihood of serious injury" and there was
insufficient evidence to establish an entire want of care or conscious indif-
ference to the employee.' 61 A vigorous dissent argued otherwise and re-
minded the majority of the court's restricted standard of review.162
151. Id.
152. 904 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. 1995).
153. Id. at 667.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 892 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1995).
157. Id at 852.
158. Id. at 853.
159. 904 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1995).
160. Id. at 642.
161. Id. at 639.




In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Burt163 the Texas Supreme Court held that the
statute dealing with the calculation of prejudgment interest in wrongful
death, personal injury, and property damage cases does not apply to ac-
tions commenced before the statute's effective date.164 The court applied
Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking'65 to determine that in cases arising
prior to the statute's effective date, "prejudgment interest in personal in-
jury and wrongful death cases involving asbestos-related injury or disease
accrues from a date six months after the date the defendant received no-
tice of the claim or the lawsuit was filed, whichever occurs first."'166
In Robinson v. Brice167 the Austin Court of Appeals held that the pre-
judgment interest statute "plainly requires not merely written notice of
an accident and resulting injuries, but also written notice of a claim" in
order for the award of prejudgment interest to accrue. 68 In Brice, a pas-
senger was injured while riding in an automobile belonging to the driver's
employer. The passenger sent a letter to the insurer of the driver's em-
ployer in which he requested that the insurer pay certain medical bills
and inquired as to when the next lost wages check was due. The court
held that this constituted "written notice of the claim" so as to satisfy the
requirements of the prejudgment interest statute.' 69 It was sufficient to
notify the insurer that the passenger was claiming compensation for his
injuries, even though the letter was phrased as a request. 70 The Forth
Worth Court of Appeals held similarly in Bevers v. Soule.17'
IX. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In a per curiam opinion, the Texas Supreme Court held in Bala v. Max-
well172 that the Medical Liability Act preempts the wrongful death statute
of limitations when a wrongful death claim is based on medical negli-
gence. 173 Therefore, the statute of limitations expires two years after the
alleged negligence occurred and not necessarily two years from the time
of death. 174 The court stated that this preemption is not a violation of the
open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. 75
In Sonnier v. Chisholm-Ryder Co., Inc.176 the court addressed the con-
struction of the statute of repose, which requires that suits for damages
163. 897 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. 1995).
164. Id. at 768.
165. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985).
166. Owens-Illinois, 897 S.W.2d at 769.
167. 894 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
168. Id. at 528.
169. Id. at 529.
170. Id.
171. 909 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
172. 909 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1995).
173. Id. at 892-93.
174. Id at 893.
175. Id.
176. 909 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. 1995).
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against a person who constructs or repairs an improvement to real prop-
erty must be brought not later than 10 years after the substantial comple-
tion of the improvement.177 The plaintiff was injured by a tomato
chopping machine and sued the manufacturer. The chopper was origi-
nally purchased and installed in Sugarland, but was later removed and
installed in Brazoria County. The manufacturer raised the 10-year statute
of repose as a defense. The court held that the statute was not intended
to grant repose to manufacturers in product liability suits, rather the stat-
ute was only to preclude suits against those in the construction industry
that annex personalty to realty. 178 The court also held that the subse-
quent annexation in Brazoria County created a new 10-year statute of
repose protecting those who annexed the chopper to the realty there, as-
suming the facts support a finding that the chopper was considered an
improvement. 179
In Smith v. Gray 80 plaintiffs purchased a house from defendants and
later discovered major structural damage. They immediately filed a claim
with their insurance company. While investigating the claim, the insur-
ance company discovered that prior to the time of the sale, defendants
knew about the damage but failed to disclose it to plaintiffs. The plain-
tiffs filed suit and alleged violations of the DTPA, and the defendants
moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. The
court of appeals held that the plaintiffs' action was barred because the
statute of limitations commenced when the plaintiffs discovered the dam-
age, rather than when the plaintiffs discovered the alleged DTPA
violation.18'
In Cox v. Upjohn Co.18 2 the Dallas Court of Appeals applied the doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment to the statute of limitation and reversed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment. The Dallas Court held that
"[t]o hold otherwise would, in effect, be telling a wrongdoer that as long
as it conceals the existence of a cause of action for two years after the
injured party's death, it is free and clear of responsibility.' 83
X. TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. PREMISE OR SPECIAL DEFEcT
The Tyler Court of Appeals held in Hindman v. State Department of
Highways and Public Transportation84 that a bump on the shoulder of
the highway is not considered a "special defect" so as to accord a bicyclist
the status of an invitee.' 85 The court stated that the bump was not an
177. Id. at 478.
178. Id. at 482.
179. Id. at 483.
180. 907 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1995).
181. Id.
182. 913 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ).
183. Id. at 231.
184. 906 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. App.-'Tyler 1994, writ denied).
185. Id. at 46.
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"excavation" or an "obstruction" since it only occupied about one-third
of the shoulder's width.186 Further, the bump could not be considered
unexpected or unusual, especially because it was "not hidden or obscured
from the vision of one approaching it.'' 187 The same court in Texas v.
Williams'88 held that a sign that was lying in the middle of a traffic lane
was a special defect. 189
B. USE OR NONUSE OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
In Kassen v. Hatley' 90 a government hospital refused to admit a patient
and return her medicine based on the patient's medical records, file, and
the hospital's emergency room procedures manual. Subsequently, the pa-
tient committed suicide, and her parents filed a wrongful death action
against the hospital. The hospital argued that the parents "failed to allege
a use of tangible personal property as required under the Texas Tort
Claims Act."' 91 The plaintiff relied on the condition or use of the follow-
ing property: Johnson's medical records, the difficult patient file, an
emergency room procedures manual, and the confiscated medicine. 192
The Texas Supreme Court held that this property is not considered "tan-
gible personal property" within the meaning of the Texas Tort Claims
Act.' 93 Thus, the hospital was immune from liability. Also, the court
held that "the non-use of available drugs during emergency medical treat-
ment is not a use of tangible personal property that triggers waiver of
sovereign immunity."'1 94 This case followed the court's earlier retreat
from the 1993 case of Texas Dept. Mental Health and Mental Retardation
v. Petty.195
In Kerrville State Hospital v. Clark'96 the Austin Court of Appeals held
that the state hospital's prescription of oral medications instead of inject-
able ones for a patient constituted a misuse of tangible personal property,
where oral medications were inappropriate based on the patient's
history.' 97
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Vela v. City of McAllen' 98 held
that the arranging of furniture by law enforcement officers to facilitate a
booking process constituted the use of tangible personal property.199 In
186. Id. at 45.
187. It at 45-46.
188. No. 12-93-00236-CV, 1995 WL 515834 (Tex. App.-yler, Aug. 31, 1995, writ
requested).
189. Id. at *2.
190. 887 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1994).
191. Id. at 7.
192. Id. at 13.
193. Id. at 14 (citing University of Tex. Med. Branch v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.
1994)).
194. Id.
195. 848 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. 1992).
196. 900 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ granted).
197. Id at 434.
198. 894 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
199. Id. at 840.
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Vela, police took the plaintiff into custody on a public intoxication charge.
The plaintiff's son informed the police that his father suffered from epi-
lepsy and was about five hours late in taking his medication. While the
plaintiff was in the booking room, he fell, hit his face on a metal stool,
and had a seizure, injuring himself even further. The court held that the
booking officer's placement of the stool was equivalent to "use" of the
booking room, and that the officer improperly "used" the room because
he failed to use it in such a manner as to avoid injury to plaintiff.200
C. NOTICE PROVISIONS
In Cathey v. Booth20' the Texas Supreme Court discussed the Tort
Claim Act's formal notice requirements and actual notice exception. The
plaintiffs sued a hospital, alleging that its negligence resulted in the still-
birth of their child and in physical pain and mental anguish to themselves.
The plaintiffs failed to provide the hospital with appropriate notice of
their claims pursuant to § 101.101(c) of the Texas Civil Practice and Rem-
edies Code. However, plaintiffs claimed that the hospital received actual
notice of their claims in that it had knowledge that a death occurred. The
court disagreed, holding that actual notice requires that the hospital have
knowledge of: (1) death or injury; (2) its alleged fault producing or con-
tributing to the death or injury; and (3) the identity of the parties
involved. 202
In Texas v. Williams 20 3 the 'Tler Court of Appeals held that Highway
Department employees who witnessed an accident that ensued when the
plaintiff drove over a sign lying in the middle of a traffic lane had actual
notice of the plaintiff's claim against the Department.
D. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
In Gibson v. Spinks204 the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and held that a judgment in an action against a governmental unit
under the Tort Claims Act bars the simultaneous rendition of judgment
against the employee whose actions gave rise to the claim.205 A passen-
ger was riding in a car struck by a police car. The trial court held that the
town's immunity was waived under the Tort Claims Act, but that the
town's liability was statutorily limited to $250,000.206
200. Id.
201. 900 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1995).
202. Id at 341.
203. No. 12-93-00236, 1995 WL 515834 (Tex. App.-Iyler, Aug. 31, 1995 writ
requested).
204. 895 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1995).
205. Id at 356-57.





The Texas Supreme Court in E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. C.R.
Robinson207 considered the standards applicable for the admissibility of
expert testimony concerning novel scientific evidence. The court effec-
tively adopted the factors cited by the United States Supreme Court in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals20 8 to use when determining the
admissibility of this type of evidence. The four non-exclusive factors for
the trial court to consider are: (1) has the theory or technique at issue is
testable, and has it been tested? (2) has the theory or technique been
subjected to peer review and publication? (3) what is the known or po-
tential error rate, and are there standards controlling the technique's op-
eration? and (4) is the theory or technique generally accepted? 20 9
The court held that in addition to showing that an expert is qualified,
Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence also requires the propo-
nent to show that the expert's testimony is relevant and reliable. 210 The
trial court is responsible for making that preliminary determination and
may use the above four factors in doing so.211
In Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye21 2 the expert testified in a products
liability case that the plaintiff suffered from frostbite as a result of using
the defendant's product (Polysporin spray). The expert based his opinion
on the assumptions (1) that there was no redness on the plaintiff's foot
after the spray was applied; and (2) that the plaintiff did not apply the
spray as directed. The Texas Supreme Court held that this testimony did
not constitute evidence to support causation.21 3 The court stated that
"when an expert's opinion is based on assumed facts that vary materially
from the actual, undisputed facts, the opinion is without probative value
and cannot support a verdict or judgment. '214
B. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The Texas Supreme Court granted writ in Medina v. Herrera215 to de-
termine whether the election of remedies doctrine applies to a situation
in which an employee receives workers' compensation benefits and then
sues the employer for an intentional tort. The Fourteenth Court of Ap-
peals held that once an injured employee had received workers' compen-
sation, the election of remedies doctrine precluded him from bringing an
intentional tort claim for the same injuries against his employer.216 How-
207. 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 852 (Feb. 7, 1995).
208. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
209. Id at 2797-98.
210. Du Pont, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 858.
211. Id.
212. 907 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1995).
213. Id. at 499-500.
214. Id at 499.
215. 905 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ granted).
216. Id at 627.
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ever, the court held that the claims were "not mutually exclusive if the
intentional act produced an injury independent from that for which work-
ers' compensation was claimed. '217 The court also stated that although
the employee asserted a lack of understanding of his right to pursue an
intentional tort claim, this did not preclude a finding that he made an
"informed" election of remedies when he accepted workers' compensa-
tion, if such a finding is even necessary. 218
In Texas Workers' Compensation Commission v. Bridge City2 19 the
Austin Court of Appeals discussed the Workers' Compensation Act pro-
vision under which a carrier is not entitled to reimbursement for pay-
ments made between the contested case decision requiring payment and
the affirming appeals panel decision. The court held that even if the lat-
ter decision is overturned on judicial review, the provision does not vio-
late the due process or takings provisions of the Texas Constitution. 220
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals in ESIS, Inc., Servicing Contractor v.
Johnson221 held that: (1) decisions of the Workers' Compensation Com-
mission Appeals Panel are admissible in district court review proceed-
ings; (2) issues not raised during the administrative proceedings cannot be
raised for the first time in district court; and (3) the Commission has the
right to intervene in the judicial review proceedings regardless of whether
it has a justiciable interest in the outcome. 222 ESIS was decided under
the new Workers' Compensation Act.
C. INSURANCE POLICY EXCLUSIONS
In Truck Insurance Exchange v. Musick223 the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals addressed the fellow employee exclusion in a standard form motor
vehicle insurance policy. The exclusion applied to bodily injury to the
insured's fellow employees arising out of and in the course of the fellow
employee's employment. The court held that the exclusion precluded
coverage for a suit based on an accident in which the insured construction
company employee backed his truck over another employee. 224 It was
stipulated that the two were fellow employees and that the injury arose
out of and in the course and scope of the injured employee's employ-
ment.225 The court also held that the fellow employee exclusion is not
against public policy.226
In Potomac Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Peppers227 the Houston division
of the federal district court held that the knowledge of falsity exclusion
217. Id. at n.2 (citing Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983)).
218. Id. at 628.
219. 900 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
220. Id. at 416.
221. 908 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ requested).
222. See generally id
223. 902 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
224. Id. at 71.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 890 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
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and the employee practices exclusion barred a shareholder's claim that
the president of the corporation, another shareholder, defamed him.
2 28
The shareholder claimed that the alleged defamation arose out of the
president's respective position in the corporation and killed many valua-
ble business relationships. The court held that because the defamation
was considered personal injury arising from employment-related prac-
tices, the exclusions bar the shareholder's claim.229
XII. TORT REFORM UPDATE
The legislature recently made sweeping changes in the area of tort re-
form. Changes to both procedural and substantive law are evidenced in
several major areas: medical malpractice, exemplary damages, joint and
several liability, venue, and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
A. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Perhaps some of the most dramatic changes are within the Medical Lia-
bility and Insurance Improvement Act.230 A claimant now must file a
cost bond of $5000 supporting a claim against each defendant within 90
days after filing, or must place $5000 cash in an escrow account for each
defendant. 231 In the alternative, he or she may file an expert report for
each defendant instead of filing a cost bond or placing cash in escrow
2 32
The parties may agree to extend any time period. Such agreements must
be honored by the court if signed by the affected parties or their council
and filed with the court.
By the 180th day after filing of the lawsuit, a claimant must file an
expert report and the expert's curriculum vitae.233 There are no discov-
ery or deposition questions permitted regarding these expert reports.
The deadline may be extended for various reasons, such as a showing of
good cause or an agreement by the parties.
A claimant may file an unlimited number of the expert reports. The
reports must address the issues of liability and causation, but not dam-
ages. A summary of the expert's opinion regarding the standard of care,
departures from the standard of care, and proximate cause must also be
provided for in the report.234 The reports cannot be admitted into evi-
dence by a defendant.
New qualifications for experts were also addressed. The expert must
presently be practicing medicine or practicing when the malpractice oc-
curred and must know the standard of care. He or she must be qualified
based on training, meaning the expert is board certified or has other sub-
228. Id. at 644-45.
229. Id. at 645.
230. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon 1996).
231. Id. § 13.01(a)(1).
232. Id. § 13.01(a)(2).
233. Id. § 13.01(d).
234. Id. § 13.01(r)(6).
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stantial training. These qualifications apply to standard of care issues
only.235 Generally, any objections to the qualifications of a claimant's
expert must be made no later than the twenty-first day after the date the
objecting party received a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae or the
date of the witnesses' deposition.
B. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Another major area in which changes have been made is exemplary
damages. With the exception of cases where the wrongdoer's conduct
can be considered felonious, Texas' new "Punitive Damages Bill" caps
punitive damages to the greater of $200,000 or two times the amount of
economic damages plus any non-economic damages up to $750,000. The
court must bifurcate the trial upon motion by any defendant. The burden
of proof for punitive damage claims is raised from a "preponderance of
the evidence" standard to "clear and convincing evidence. '236
A defendant will be liable for punitive damages when the harm re-
sulted from fraud, malice, willful acts, omissions, or gross neglect in
wrongful death actions brought under article 16, section 26 of the Texas
Constitution. The new statute's definition of "malice" is gleaned from
the Moriel opinion's definition of gross negligence.237
Further, additional limitations have been placed on the circumstances
under which punitive damages can be recovered for the criminal acts of
third parties. The defendant is liable for certain criminal acts committed
by his or her employees or agents, where the defendant was a party to the
criminal act, or where the criminal act resulted from the defendant's in-
tentional or knowing violation of the specified apartment standards set
forth in the Property Code.
Juries now have specific instructions relating to what is to be consid-
ered in an award of punitive damages. The trier of fact shall consider the
Alamo factors: (1) the nature of the wrong; (2) the character of the con-
duct involved; (3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer; (4) the situ-
ation and sensibilities of the parties concerned; (5) the extent to which
the conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety; and (6) the
net worth of the defendant.
C. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
This new bill establishes a comparative bar for claimants in any tort
action at greater than fifty percent. 238 It only allows for several liability
except where the responsibility of a defendant is greater than fifty per-
cent. The Bill also allows a defendant to join certain third-parties and
have their responsibility submitted to the trier of fact.
235. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i; § 14.01 (Vernon 1996).
236. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (Vernon 1996).
237. Id.
238. Id. § 33.001.
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D. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
This legislative session saw significant changes in the prohibitions
against unfair insurance and consumer practices.239 A person may now
sue for insurance practices declared to be unfair or deceptive in section 4
of article 21.21, which was amended to add additional prohibitions
against misrepresentations and unfair claim settlement practices. Suit is
allowed by any person who has sustained actual damages "caused by" a
violation of the DTPA. Also, the statute now specifically precludes
double recovery.
Rather than a mandatory trebling of actual damages, the bill provides
for discretionary trebling of actual damages if the defendant acted know-
ingly. Notice to the defendant must be given in the form of a written
demand at least sixty days before suit is filed.
There have been legislative changes within the Consumer Protection
Act as well. The new bill allows a written waiver to be signed by a con-
sumer in any transaction where the consumer is not in a significantly dis-
parate position and is represented by independent legal counsel.
The definition of "knowingly" is now defined as an actual awareness, at
the time of the act or practice complained of, of the falsity, deception, or
unfairness of the act or practice. "Knowingly" also means actual aware-
ness of the condition, defect, or failure constituting a breach of
warranty.24 0
The new law adds a laundry list of prohibitions for price gouging during
a natural disaster. A showing of detrimental reliance is necessary to re-
cover for a violation of the prohibition on this list.
Another important new provision is the exemption for any person who
provided professional services and any vicariously liable entities. Also,
the bill excludes all claims for bodily injury, death, and mental anguish,
but mental anguish is allowed if the defendant acted knowingly. There is
no longer automatic trebling of the first $1,000 of economic damages. In-
stead, the court has discretion if the defendant acted knowingly.
E. VENUE
"Tort Reform" also made a big impact on venue issues. For example,
the general venue rule was changed to make four potential places proper
in all situations: (1) where all or a substantial part of the events or omis-
sions giving rise to the claim occurred; (2) in the county of the defend-
ant's residence at the time the cause of action accrued if the defendant is
a natural person; (3) in the county of the defendant's principal office if
the defendant is not a natural person; or (4) if 1, 2, and 3 do not apply, in
the county where the plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action
accrued.241
239. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1996).
240. Id. § 2(c).
241. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002 (Vernon 1996).
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A court may transfer from one county of proper venue to another if:
(1) maintenance in the original county would work an injustice; (2) the
balance of interests of all of the parties predominates in favor of transfer;
and (3) transfer would not work an injustice to any other party.242
242. Id. § 15.002(b).
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